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take a fee simple in part of the land devised, there would be a possibility
that this part would pass to some stranger to the blood of the testator.
The Kentucky court believes that such a result would be contrary to
the testator's intention.

6

In contrast to the above reasons for repudiating the second resolution in Wild's Case, there are three main reasons advanced for adherence to the rule. They are: (1) such a construction is in conformity
with the plain import of the words ;17 (2) if a life estate and remainder
were intended, it would have been natural and easy to expressly say
so ;"' (3) public policy, favoring the free alienation of land, is against
the life estate and remainder construction. 9
However, because of the importance of effectuating the intent of
the grantor or testator, the life estate and remainder construction appears to be more reasonable than the concurrent ownership construction. One ordinarily thinks of parent and children enjoying property
successively and not concurrently. Since the average grantor or testator probably has this in mind and since he also probably wants to benefit
all of A's children, whenever born, his probable intention is more likely
to be carried out' by the life estate and remainder construction. 20
The problem of construction involved in a conveyance or devise to
A and his children has never been before the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Careful drafting of deeds and wills eliminates the problem, but if it ever
does arise, it is suggested that the life estate and remainder construction be adopted for the reasons given above.
WILLIAm A. GIGURE

Bailments - Effect of Statute Imputing Negligence of Conditional Vendee, Bailee, or Negligence of Agents, Servants or
Employees of said Vendee or Bailee to Conditional Vendor or
Bailor-Plaintiff brought an action against defendant for damages
to plaintiff's automobile which damages resulted from a collision between defendant's automobile and plaintiff's automobile, the latter being
driven by an employee of plaintiff's bailee. The bailor-bailee relationship arose out of the commonly known "rent-a-car" contract, but it
16 Shelman & Co. v. Livers' Exec'r, 229 Ky. 90, 16 S.W. 2d 800 (1929) ; Lacey's
Exec'r v. Lacey, 170 Ky. 160, 185 S.W. 495 (1916); Davis v. Hardin, 80 Ky.

672 (1880).

1 Moore v. Ennis, supra, note 12. Also, see Note, L.R.A. 1917 B 49, 50, 51.
Is Graham v. Fowler, 13 Serg. & R. 439 (Pa. 1826). Also, see Note, L.R.A. 1917
B 49, 51.
19 Ewing v. Ewing, 198 Miss. 304, 22 So. 2d 225, 227, 228, 161 A.L.R. 606, 610, 611
(1945).
20 Casner, supra, note 2, at 459. The life estate and remainder construction is
embodied in PROPOSD UNIFORM PROPERTY ACT SEC. 13. However, the RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY sec. 283 (a) (1940) follows the second resolution in Wild's
Case.
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appeared to be immaterial whether the bailment was gratuitous or for
profit. The employee of plaintiff's bailee was contributorily negligent.
The employee was taking his children to a barbershop for haircuts.
Defendant relied on a statute to prevent recovery. Said statute, R.S.
46:36-1, N.J.S.A., provides:
"Whenever a conditional vendor, bailor, or owner of the general
property in goods or chattels or the assignee or assignees of said
conditional vendor, bailor or owner of the general property in
goods or chattels, shall institute suit for damages to said goods
or chattels, while the same are in the custody, control or possession of the conditional vendee, bailee, or owner of the special
property in said goods or chattels or the agents, servants, or
employees of said conditional vendee, bailee, or owner of the
special property in said goods and chattels, against a third party
or parties, or against the agents, servants, or employees of said
third party or parties, or both, based on the negligence of the
said third party or parties, or the agents, servants, or employees
of said third party or parties, the contributory negligence of the
conditional vendee, bailee, or owner of the special property in
said goods or chattels, or of the agents, servants, or employees of
said conditional vendee, bailee or owner of the said special property in said goods or chattels shall constitute a proper and valid
defense to said action and be a complete bar to recovery in the
same manner as though suit were brought by the conditional
vendee, bailee, or owner of the special property in said goods
or chattels or by the agents, servants or employees of the conditional vendee, bailee, or owner of the special property in said
goods and chattels."
Held: Judgment for the defendant. The bailor's suit was barred by
the contributory negligence of the employee of the bailee, notwithstanding the employee was driving the automobile on an errand unrelated to
his employment. Motorlease Corp. v. Mulroony, 66 A.2d 765 (N.J.
1952).
The statue relied on by the defendant is unusual in regard to the
majority rule obtaining throughout the United States. The reason
given for the enactment of the statute is that it is unjust to allow a third
party a defense against a bailee, yet deny him that defense in a suit by a
bailor based on the same set of circumstances.' Therefore a third party,
under the statute, is now able to use the same defense in both actions.
It is to be observed, however, that the statute does not impose liability
upon the bailor for the negligence of the bailee or his agent.
The primary aim of this article is to examine the general policy of a
statute of the kind applied in the principal case, and not to discuss the
rather unusual broadening of the term "employee" accomplished by the
New Jersey court.
I Motorlease Corp. v. Mulroony, 13 N.J. Super. 556, 81 A2d 25 (1951).
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The court stated that the defense of contributory negligence is available if the agent, servant or employee of the bailee is in lawful custody,
control or possession of the vehicle, irrespective of the fact' that at the
moment of collision the car was not being used in the scope of the
bailee's business. 2 This appears to extend, for purposes of the particular statute in issue, the ordinary legal definition of the term "employee."
From the general trend of Wisconsin decisions, assuming that Wisconsin had a statute comparable to the New Jersey law in the instant case,
the courts would probably hold that the employee of the bailee was outside the scope of employment and that the statute, therefore, would not
apply.' If the Wisconsin legislature sees fit to pass a statute comparable
to the one in question, it would be well to express clearly what is meant
to be covered by the term "agent," "servant" and "employee."
The New Jersey statute quite clearly changes the law generally followed in other jurisdictions. The old rule pertaining to the bailor-bailee
relationship was that the negligence of the bailee would be imputed to
the bailor to prevent the bailor from recovering damages from a third
party for damage to a bailed article.4 This conception was changed
around the turn of the century. The weight of modern authority
favors the rule that in a bailor-bailee relationship, without any element
of partnership, principal and agent, or master and servant, the contributory negligence of the bailee cannot be imputed to the bailor to bar
his recovering against a negligent third party for damage to the bailed
property.5
t'he rule in Wisconsin follows the above rule closely as to the relationship of bailor and bailee, conditional vendor and vendee. The
negligence of the bailee cannot be imputed to the bailor unless said
bailor has some right of control, supervision or direction over the acts
of the bailee. The doctrine of imputed negligence applies only in cases
where the act of negligence can be said to be that of the party injured. 6
A good example of the application of this reasoning is contained in the
handling of the problem of the family relationship. The relationship of
itself is not sufficient to impute negligence. The negligence of a member
of the family must be in the prosecution of the business of the owner
of the property. In other words, the owner must have some right of
7
control over the member of the family who is negligent.
At first glance, the statute seems inequitable in that it prevents a
party, who is free of fault, recovering from a party whose negligent act
2

Supra, note 1.
3 Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. Schreiber, 150 Wis. 52, 135 N.W. 507,
511 (1912).
4 See Note 6 A.L.R. 316 (1920) ; 30 A.L.R. 1248 (1924).
5 Spelman v. Delano, 177 Mo. App. 28, 163 S.E. 300 (1913).
6 Calumet Auto Co. v. Ding, 190 Wis. 84, 208 N.W. 927 (1926).
7Crossett v. Goelzer, 177 Wis. 455, 188 N.W. 627 (1922).
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was a proximate cause of the damage to the property. However, a
number of cases, generally involving automobiles, made a change necessary. In a typical case, a man would allow a member of the family
to use his automobile under circumstances which prevented any agency
or employee relationship from being established and under circumstances such that a third party could not prove the owner negligent in
placing the automobile in the hands of an incompetent. The member of
the family would become, involved in an accident in which both he and
the third party were causally negligent. Under prevailing rules, the
owner can recover the full amount of property damage to the automobile from the third party even though the negligence of the third party
was small compared to that of the person driving the owner's automobile. The New Jersey statute provides a remedy for this situation.
Nevertheless, the statute by itself is not entirely desirable from the
standpoint of complete justice. Supposing the bailee to be guilty of a
small degree of negligence, the bailor is prevented from recovering for
any of the damage to his automobile in a state where contributory negligence is a complete defense to an action of tflis type."
The Wisconsin statute on comparative negligence can remedy the
injustice resulting, in certain cases which would arise under a law comparable to that of New Jersey. Wis. STATs. (1951), sec. 331.045 states:
"Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by
any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property,
if such negligence wasnot as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminshed in the proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering."
Under this statute, where both parties to a collision are negligent and
there is a counterclaim, one of the parties may recover when there is a
finding that his negligence is less than that of the other, but his recovery
must be reduced in proportion to his negligence. 9 This means that a
person can recover only for the amount of damage which is not due to
any fault of his.
Wisconsin, by the enactment of a statute modeled after that of New
Jersey, would increase the fairness of decisions rendered in cases similair to the one in the instant case and the hypothetical case described
herein. The courts and the legislature should always attempt to improve the inherent fairness and justice of their decisions and statutes.
It would therefore seem that a similar statute would be a step forward for Wisconsin' However, certain points should be kept in mind.
8 5 Am. JUR. AuTOMOBILE § 503 ; 38 Am. Jtn. NEGLIGNCEE §233.
9 Paluczak v. Jones, 209 Wis. 640, 245 N.W. 655 (1932); Walker v. Kroger

Grocery and Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
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First, a statute should expressly limit its effect so as to prevent recovery
by a third party based upon the imputed negligence. It should not be
used as a basis for a suit or counterclaim by a third party against a person who has no right of control over his bailee, vendee, or the agent,
servant or employee of such bailee or vendee. Secondly, the legislature
should frame the statute so that there can be no misunderstanding of
the meaning of "agent," "servant" or "employee" within the act. If
this is done, Wisconsin courts will be able to handle such situations,
which have come under much criticism, in a fair and equitable manner.
DOUGLAS J. MCCLELLAND
Judgments - Equitable Relief from Judgments Obtained by
deceased had been sued for
Fraud, Intrinsic and Extrinsic -The
divorce by the plaintiff in 1946 and in his answer set for his
property with particularly. The plaintiff at that time had no knomwledge of the amount of property owned by the deceased and was not
guilty of negligence in ascertaining the facts. The court relied on the
defendant's representations and confirmed a pre-trial stipulation as to
the apportionment of the defendant's property. On learning of the
actual holdings of the decedent at an inventory and appraisal filed
after his death, the plaintiff sued the executor of the decedent's estate
in equity praying for relief from the property settlement on the
ground that it was based on the decedent's fraud perpetrated on the
court. The relief was not granted by the trial court. Held: Judgment
reversed. The power of a court of equity to relieve against unconscionable judgments for fraud will not be strictly confined to those that are
characterized by extrinsic fraud. Weber v. Weber et al, 260 Wis. 420,
51 N.W. 2nd 18 (1952).
The general rule in the United States is that the acts for which a
court of equity will grant relief from a judgment because of fraud
must relate to extrinsic or collateral fraud and that intrinsic fraud
is not sufficient."
The United States Supreme Court followed that rule in United
States v. Throckmorton, and defined extrinsic fraud as that relating
to matter not tried by the court rendering the judgment and intrinsic
fraud as that relating to matter on which the decree was rendered,
and stated that:
"Where the unsuccessful party had been prevented from
exhibiting full his case, by fraud or deception practised on him
by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false
promise of compromise; or where the defendant never had
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by acts of the
131 AM. JUR. JUDGMENTS §654 (1940).

